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1. Introduction
The eﬀective conduct of monetary policy is complicated by uncertainty. There are
many dimensions to this uncertainty: uncertainty about shocks, model parameters, data,
and the “correct” model of the economy itself (see Thiessen (1995) and Poole (1998) for
discussions). At a practical level, one of the key uncertainties facing policy-makers is the
level of output that can be maintained without adding to inﬂation pressures (referred
to as the level of potential output). While policy-makers can continue to reﬁne and
improve the measurement of potential output, (see Kuttner (1992), Laxton and Tetlow
(1992), Butler (1996), St-Amant and van Norden (1997), or Dupasquier, Guay, and St-
Amant (1999) for a discussion of the various ways potential output is measured), to
a considerable degree uncertainty about potential output is fundamental. Thus, the
challenge for policy-makers is how to deal with this uncertainty.
Three possible responses by the central bank to uncertainty about potential output
that have been examined analytically are to (i) ignore the uncertainty and follow the
“certainty equivalent” policy; (ii) act “conservatively,” by which is meant moving inter-
est rates by less than is implied by the certainty equivalent policy; or (iii) “probe” or
experiment, which implies that the central bank actively uses its policy response to learn
about the level of potential output.
To formalize probing within an economic model, one must understand what it means
in terms of the behavior of the central bank. However, there is no consensus on this.
One interpretation of probing is that it entails optimal learning, that is, following a more
aggressive policy to learn about the parameters of the economy. Probing of this type
results in more precise estimates, and therefore smaller policy mistakes in future periods.
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Building on Wieland’s (1998) analysis of this issue, I consider a simple calibrated model
in the Canadian context and examine the relationship between this deﬁnition of probing
and credibility.
Many inﬂation targeting central banks have put signiﬁcant emphasis on attaining
credibility for their policy objectives in recent years (see Amano, Coletti, and Macklem
(1999) for details of steps taken by the Bank of Canada, for example). These steps have
increased the accountability of the central banks and that, together with the realized
inﬂation record, has enhanced their credibility in the sense that expectations of inﬂation
have become more ﬁrmly anchored to the inﬂation target (see Johnson (1997, 1998) or
Perrier (1998) for evidence of this). The question addressed here is whether an increase
in credibility increases the desirability of probing. In other words, should a central bank
that has increased its credibility follow a more aggressive policy in order to obtain more
precise estimates of the parameters of the economy? I ﬁnd that, for plausible parameter
values, the optimal amount of probing is small and varies little with credibility. It is only
for low levels of credibility or unrealistically large amounts of uncertainty or volatility
that the optimal policy with probing diverges signiﬁcantly from a policy that ignores
learning. Even then, the optimal amount of probing diminishes as credibility rises.
At an intuitive level, the returns to probing decrease as credibility increases because
credibility makes learning more diﬃcult. As credibility increases, inﬂation becomes more
ﬁrmly anchored to the inﬂation target; thus the out-turn for inﬂation is less informative
about potential output. To illustrate this with an example, suppose that the central
bank is underestimating potential output and, as a result, incorrectly believes that the
economy is operating at potential. With low credibility, inﬂation will lie below the target,
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allowing the central bank to infer that its estimate of potential was incorrect. At higher
levels of credibility, inﬂation is more ﬁrmly anchored to the target, so that inﬂation
provides a weaker signal that potential output is higher than was previously believed.
The next section summarizes the literature supporting a conservative monetary pol-
icy in the face of uncertainty regarding the economy. Section 3 summarizes articles
arguing for a more aggressive policy. An outline of the model is given in Section 4,
followed by discussion of the parameter values in Section 5 and results in Section 6.
Conclusions follow in Section 7.
2. Uncertainty and Conservatism
A number of authors, starting with Brainard (1967), argue that uncertainty is a
motivator for a conservative monetary policy. Brainard considers a simple model given
by
y = ap + u, (1)
where the objective of the policy-maker is to choose the value of the policy variable p
that minimizes the value of the policy-maker’s loss function, (y − y∗)2. Under certainty,
the optimal policy takes the form of
p = (y∗ − u)/a, (2)
and the policy-maker achieves the objective. Uncertainty can enter into this problem in
two diﬀerent ways: additive uncertainty, via the value of u; or multiplicative uncertainty,
via the value of a.
In the presence of uncertainty, the policy-maker seeks to minimize the expected value
of the loss function. Additive uncertainty has no eﬀect on the optimal policy prescription,
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except that it is now a function of the expected, rather than the true, value of u:
p = (y∗ − E(u))/a. (3)
This is referred to as the “certainty equivalent” policy, since the presence of uncertainty
does not change the optimal policy response.
In the presence of multiplicative uncertainty, the optimal policy departs from the
certainty equivalent policy, since the variance of a as well as the covariance of a and u
now enter into the policy in the following way:
p = E(a)(y∗ − E(u)− σau)/(E(a)2 + σ2a). (4)
In the special case that E(u) = 0 and σau = 0, the optimal policy rule reduces to
p = y∗/[E(a) + (σ2a/E(a))]. (5)
Since σ2a is positive, the optimal policy response to shocks is smaller, or more conservative,
than the certainty equivalent policy.
Other authors obtain similar results in a variety of frameworks. Aoki (1998) consid-
ers the eﬀect of measurement errors on optimal monetary policy. He models the manner
in which the central bank extracts information about economic shocks from noisy in-
dicators using a dynamic sticky-price model. He shows that the central bank should
respond to its forecasts of both the current output gap and current inﬂation, even if it
is concerned only about inﬂation, although its response should be cautious due to the
presence of measurement error.
Smets (1998) considers a simple model of the economy based on the Rudebusch
and Svensson (1999) model in which the Taylor rule is non-optimal. He assumes that
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the output gap is measured with error, so that additive uncertainty is present in the
model. As in the Brainard example, optimal central bank behavior is not aﬀected by
this uncertainty. However, if the central bank were to restrict itself to using a Taylor
rule to formulate policy, a conservative response to the estimated output gap would be
desirable in the presence of output gap uncertainty. Similarly, Svensson (1999) ﬁnds that
the optimal monetary policy under parameter uncertainty is more conservative than
the certainty equivalent policy in a simple analytic model. Srour (1999) extends his
framework to an open economy context and obtains the same result, although the degree
of conservatism is not great for plausible parameter values.
In some models, the NAIRU (Non Accelerating Inﬂation Rate of Unemployment)
may serve the same role for monetary policy purposes as potential output. Estrella and
Mishkin (1999) consider the impact of uncertainty in the NAIRU on optimal monetary
policy in a simple linear model. They show that uncertainty of this type has no eﬀect
on the optimal policy, but uncertainty as to the trade-oﬀ between unemployment and
inﬂation results in a more conservative optimal policy.
Bean (1999) studies the implications of a convex Phillips curve on the optimal policy
under uncertainty. The optimal policy displays conservatism, and output is less than
potential on average. In contrast to Brainard (1967), however, the presence of uncertainty
here leads to a systematic bias in policy: policy should always be set tighter than it would
be in the absence of uncertainty.1
Sack (1998) argues that the central bank is conﬁdent about the relationship between
output and monetary policy if policy remains close to recent levels, but less conﬁdent
as it moves away from levels implemented in the recent past. He assumes an I.S. curve
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given by
yt+1 = αt+1 − φt+1it, (6)
where it is the policy instrument while α and φ, a measure of policy eﬀectiveness, evolve
through time. The variance of output is increasing in changes to the policy variable,
so that the optimal policy entails gradual adjustment over time. These gradual changes
provide informative observations about the eﬀect of policy and the value of parameters
in the economy and thereby reduce uncertainty about the impact of future policy.
In all of the above cases, uncertainty results in a more conservative optimal policy.
The next section outlines frameworks in which uncertainty may lead to probing.
3. Uncertainty and Probing
A number of authors provide frameworks where the optimal policy of a central bank
entails some probing or experimenting. For example, Caplin and Leahy (1996) suggest
that policymakers learn about the economy by observing the economy’s response to policy
shocks. When the economy is operating below potential, the aim of the central bank is to
stimulate output via lowering interest rates to the point where some (but not all) planned
investment projects will be undertaken. They argue that small decreases in the interest
rate may result in little economic response, as agents will (correctly) infer that future
reductions in interest rates are likely to follow. Proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrms defer investment
projects that are proﬁtable at current interest rates until those rates fall further. As
a result, both the length of recessions and the amount of policy adjustment required
to attain potential output may be larger if the policy is changed gradually than if it is
changed rapidly.
An alternative view of probing, and the one that is used here, assumes that poli-
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cymakers use the latest available data to estimate the parameters of the economy each
period. These new estimates are then used in policy formulation. If policy-makers ignore
the impact of their policy on this learning process, the policy-makers are said to be en-
gaged in “passive learning.” Alternatively, if the policy-maker explicitly takes account of
the impact of their policy on the learning process, the policy-maker is engaged in “active
learning” or “probing.”
As a simple illustration, consider the example of Brainard given in (1) above. Sup-
pose that the policy-maker regresses y on p each period and uses this regression to update
the estimate of a. The optimal policy of the central bank will then take account of the
amount of information generated by the policy. In general, the optimal policy that takes
account of learning will be more aggressive than the multiplicative uncertainty policy
(5), but less aggressive than the certainty equivalent policy (3), as other authors have
argued.
For example, Bertocchi and Spagat (1993) model the economy with the following
equation:
yt = y¯ + at + btMt + t, (7)
where the policy-maker seeks to control yt with Mt. The parameters at and bt change
every period and are randomly distributed with joint distribution Fab. Policy-makers
learn about this distribution by experimenting. The authors ﬁnd that the optimal policy
incorporates some experimentation. Similarly, Kendrick (1982) considers the potential
for learning within a model that contained 10 unknown (constant) parameters. He ﬁnds
that costly experimentation is desirable, and that increased model complexity increases
the amount of costly experimentation that is optimal.
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When an economy has undergone a major structural change, the central bank may
have little reliable data with which to inform policy decisions. Wieland (2000) conducts
dynamic simulations of monetary policy decisions in a model calibrated to the German
economy at the time of reuniﬁcation (1990) and shows that passive learning by the
central bank could have resulted in persistent deviations from policy objectives since
some policies yield little or no information about the state of the economy. In contrast,
a policy that incorporates active learning eliminated persistent policy mistakes.
The basic premise behind these learning models is that the policy-maker lacks the
data required to construct accurate estimates of the model parameters, despite the fact
that the parameters remain constant over time. An alternative source of uncertainty is
related to the evolution of the economy over time, as Bean (1999, 15) notes:
In practice the main source of uncertainty is ... not due to the imprecision with which
parameters are estimated as a result of econometricians having limited sample informa-
tion. Rather, a stochastic, or at best evolving, parameter model seems more appropriate
in which learning about the value of today’s parameters is of distinctly limited value for
knowing their future value.
Balvers and Cosimano (1994) consider such a model where πt = αt + βtmt, and
both αt and βt follow an AR(1) process. Over time, the policy-maker learns about
the parameters. If unanticipated inﬂation is costly, policy-makers will seek to minimize
inﬂation variability. Because high money growth leads to high inﬂation variability (a large
mt implies a high multiplier on the unknown parameter βt), the optimal policy entails
zero money growth. Balvers and Cosimano use a dynamic programming framework
to compute the optimal policy path. They assess the impact of taking into account
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learning with the “myopic” policy (when the beneﬁts of learning about the parameters
are ignored in the policy formulation process) and the “cold-turkey” policy (when money
supply growth is immediately set to zero). They ﬁnd that the optimal policy entails a
signiﬁcantly faster reduction in monetary growth than the myopic policy, but one that
is slower than the cold turkey policy.
Wieland (1998) considers the impact on policy of uncertainty as to the natural
unemployment rate, in a model very similar to the one that will be examined below. He
ﬁnds that in a static framework, a conservative policy is optimal. However, in a dynamic
framework where the central bank takes explicit account of the impact of their policy on
the amount of learning they can accomplish, the optimal policy lies between the static
and the certainty equivalent policies. The only exception to this is when there is a very
high degree of uncertainty, and inﬂation is close to the target. Then, the optimal policy
with learning is more extreme than the static policy.
Taking an entirely diﬀerent approach, Isard and Laxton (1998) consider a model
calibrated to the Australian economy in which experimentation only occurs when inﬂation
is low in an attempt by the central bank to better identify the (unknown, time-varying)
NAIRU. They incorporate endogenous credibility, so that probing may result in long-
term costs for the central bank, and a convex Phillips curve. While a probing policy may
result in a slightly lower average rate of unemployment in their framework, this occurs
at the expense of a rise in average inﬂation rates.
Finally, Stock (1999) argues that time-varying parameters make the use of robust
control desirable. He considers a simple linear model of the United States where the
parameters follow random walks, and the central bank chooses policy utilizing the mini-
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max criterion. He ﬁnds that, for some types of uncertainty, policies should be more
aggressive than point-estimates would suggest.
In general, the literature examined here suggests that the beneﬁts to actively prob-
ing in a bid to determine the level of potential output are typically small. The only
circumstance when the optimal “learning” policy is more aggressive than the certainty
equivalent policy is when output is close to potential, and the central bank faces an ex-
tremely high amount of uncertainty (Wieland 1998). In the remainder of this paper, the
relationship between credibility and the beneﬁts to probing is examined. In an economy
in which there are explicit inﬂation targets, the question addressed is whether probing
is more desirable when people believe those targets will be attained than when they do
not.
4. The Model
The economy considered here is similar to that outlined in Wieland (1998), but with
the Phillips curve deﬁned in terms of output rather than unemployment,
πt = πet + β(yt − y∗t ) + t, (8)
where t is a price shock.
The central bank does not know the value of potential output, y∗t , which follows a
random walk: y∗t = y
∗
t−1 + ηt.
2 They also do not know the slope of the Phillips curve, β
(assumed constant), and so must learn about each of these over time. Clearly, there are
also many other sources of uncertainty that enter into the problem of setting monetary
policy that are ignored here; all other parameters are assumed known by the central
bank.
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Each period, the central bank uses all available information to estimate the following
equations:
πt − πet = −αt + βyt + t,
αt ≡ βy∗t = αt−1 + νt. (9)
The estimates of αt and β from this regression are then used to form an estimate of y∗t
given by
yˆ∗t = αˆt/βˆ, (10)
which is used in the formulation of monetary policy in the following period. Monetary
policy entails the setting of the real interest rate, which inﬂuences real output according
to the relation
yt = yt−1 − γ(rt − rt−1). (11)
For simplicity, there is no uncertainty in this relationship: the central bank can always
attain a desired level of output via an appropriate choice of rt in this model, subject to
the constraint that nominal interest rates cannot be negative.3
Inﬂation expectations are a weighted mean of the target and lagged inﬂation,
πet = λπ
∗ + (1− λ)πt−1, (12)
where λ ∈ [0, 1] is a measure of credibility. Inﬂation expectations are not rational in this
model. Instead, this ad hoc speciﬁcation captures the idea that as credibility increases,
inﬂation expectations become more strongly anchored to the target of the central bank.
Furthermore, agents do not try to learn about the central bank’s preferences over time
(see, for example, Cukierman and Meltzer (1986), Faust and Svensson (2001) and related
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papers). If λ = 0 , then inﬂation expectations are equal to last period’s inﬂation rate,
while if λ = 1, inﬂation expectations are equal to the inﬂation target of the central
bank.4,5 Given the observed persistence in inﬂation, realistic values of λ are likely to be
signiﬁcantly less than 1.
The central bank seeks to minimize its loss given by
Min
rt
∑
t
ρtEt−1[(πt − π∗)2 + ω(yt − y∗t )2], (13)
where ρ is the discount rate. ω = 0 represents a central bank that cares only about
inﬂation deviations from target, while for ω → ∞, the central bank cares only about
deviations of output from potential.
In a one-period world with certainty, the optimal real interest rate would be set
according to the rule
rt = rt−1 +
1
γ
(yt−1 − yˆ∗t−1) +
1
γ
( βˆ(1− λ)
βˆ2 + ω
)
(πt−1 − π∗), (14)
subject to the restriction that the nominal interest rate cannot be negative
rt ≥ −πet . (15)
This is analogous to (3) in the Brainard case above, and will be referred to as the
“certainty equivalent” policy for the remainder of the paper. An increase in central
banker credibility (measured as an increase in λ) has the eﬀect of reducing the optimal
policy response to a deviation of the inﬂation rate from target. Inﬂation expectations (and
therefore future inﬂation rates) are less sensitive to current inﬂation at higher levels of
credibility, so that the optimal policy is less aggressive in responding to current variation
in inﬂation, all other things being equal.
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If the central bank were to explicitly allow for the impact of uncertainty on the
optimal policy in a static environment, that policy would be set according to the rule
rt = rt−1+
1
γ
(yt−1−yˆ∗t−1)+
1
γ
( βˆ(1− λ)
βˆ2 + V (βˆ) + ω
)
(πt−1−π∗)− 1
γ
(C(αˆt−1, βˆ)− αˆt−1βˆ V (βˆ)
βˆ2 + V (βˆ) + ω
)
,
(16)
again subject to the restriction that nominal interest rates cannot be negative (15).
This is analogous to (4) in the Brainard example above and will be referred to as the
“conservative” policy for the remainder of the paper. The additional term in the policy
rule may be positive or negative and, for some economic shocks, may result in a more
aggressive policy response than the certainty equivalent policy. Its presence is somewhat
counterintuitive, as Wieland (1998, 15) explains:
It implies that even in a situation where the observed inﬂation rate is on target and
[output] equals [estimated potential output], the central bank would pursue a policy
that drives [output] away from estimated [potential output] in expectation.
He goes on to explain that the ﬁnal term is a function of estimates based on historical
data and captures the idea that, with uncertainty, it is optimal for a central bank to
lean towards the historical mean of output rather than seeking to end an inﬂationary
or disinﬂationary period abruptly.6 In general, (16) implies a more conservative policy
response to shocks than (14).
Note that the diﬀerence between these two policies diminishes as the weight on
output increases in the central bank’s loss function and in the limit, as ω → ∞, the
policies converge and do not vary with credibility. For extreme values of ω (that is,
ω ∈ {0.0,∞}), these policies are also optimal in a multi-period world where there is no
learning. When the central bank targets only inﬂation or output, there is no trade-oﬀ
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between meeting the target this period and next. For 0 < ω < ∞, the extent to which
meeting the inﬂation and output targets this period precludes meeting the inﬂation target
next period varies with credibility. As a result, the optimal dynamic policy without
learning diverges from the optimal static policy. As an example of the impact of this, the
analogue of (14) for the certainty equivalent interest rate in the ﬁrst period of a world
that lasts for two periods and in which the central bank targets both inﬂation and output
is given by
rt = rt−1+
1
γ
(yt−1− yˆ∗t−1)+
1
γ
( [βˆ2 + ω + ρω(1− λ)2](1− λ)βˆ
[βˆ2 + ω + ρω(1− λ)2]βˆ2 + ω[βˆ2 + ω]
)
(πt−1−π∗). (17)
This policy rule will be used later to see if varying ω impacts the optimal amount of
probing that the central bank should undertake.
Consider a multi-period world in which the central bank learns over time. Each
period, their estimates of αt and β are updated optimally using the new data obtained.
In a world with constant parameters, this would involve Bayesian updating. Because
αt is time-varying here, the appropriate analogue to Bayesian updating that results in
eﬃcient, unbiased estimates may be cast in the form of the Kalman ﬁlter:
Σt|t−1 =
(
V αt|t−1 V
αβ
t−1
V αβt−1 V
β
t−1
)
=
(
(V αt−1|t−1 + β
2σ2η) V
αβ
t−1
V αβt−1 V
β
t−1
)
,
(
αt|t
βt|t
)
=
(
αt|t−1
βt|t−1
)
+ Σt|t−1
(−1
yt
)
F−1(πt − πet + αt|t−1 − βt|t−1yt),
Σt|t = Σt|t−1 − Σt|t−1
(
1
−yt
)
F−1 ( 1 −yt ) Σt|t−1,
F = ( 1 −yt ) Σt|t−1
(
1
−yt
)
+ σ2 . (18)
The optimal policy that takes account of the learning process and optimizes the
amount of learning is now the solution to a highly non-linear problem that cannot be
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solved analytically. Other authors resort to computationally intensive techniques in order
to approximate the optimal policy.7 Here, the economy is simulated under varying degrees
of policy credibility. This has the advantage of being less computationally intensive,
allowing for a broader range of parameter values to be considered than has been elsewhere,
at the cost of precision.
For tractability reasons, the economy is assumed to have a ﬁnite life. In an economy
with only one period, the optimal policy with active learning coincides with the con-
servative policy, since there is no time for the central bank to beneﬁt from information
obtained in the ﬁrst period. With two periods, these policies diﬀer only in the ﬁrst pe-
riod. In reality, the beneﬁts from learning accrue in all future periods, and not just the
period immediately following. Therefore, an economy with a life of two periods provides
a lower bound on the beneﬁts of active policy.
To further examine the beneﬁts of active learning, an economy with a life of 10
periods is also considered. An optimizing central bank may be expected to undertake
active learning in every period except the ﬁnal one. However, because a grid search is
used to determine this policy, it would be computationally demanding to allow for active
learning in more than one period. Active learning is therefore restricted to the ﬁrst
period only; thereafter, the central bank follows a conservative policy and all learning is
passive.
By allowing learning only in the ﬁrst period and limiting the economy to 10 periods,
there are two oﬀsetting eﬀects on the degree of experimentation in the ﬁrst period. The
beneﬁts of learning last only 9 periods, which will reduce the amount of active learning.
But the simulations have the eﬀect of forcing central banks to endogenise the restriction
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on learning in later periods, so central banks will try to learn more in the ﬁrst period
than if they were solving the optimal dynamic policy problem. It is not clear which one of
these will dominate. Nevertheless, examining both a 2-period and a 10-period economy
oﬀers insights on the sensitivity of the results to the length chosen.
5. Parameter Values
Clearly the results obtained from this exercise are somewhat dependant upon the
choice of parameter values. Here the values chosen are outlined, as well as the reasons
for choosing them. In general, parameter values are consistent with recent studies using
Canadian data, interpreting the model at an annual frequency. Further, it is assumed
that the central bank knows how much it does not know. That is, if the bank does not
know a parameter value, then it knows the distribution from which that parameter is
drawn.
The loss function of the central bank is characterized by the following parameters:
an inﬂation target of 2 percent (π∗ = 0.02); a rate of time preference of ρ = 0.95; and
pure inﬂation targeting: ω = 0.0. In reality, a central bank is likely to care about both
the output gap and the inﬂation gap, an issue that will be addressed later.
The standard deviation of the error in the inﬂation process is σ = 0.006, or 0.6
percent on an annual basis, while the standard deviation of shocks to potential output
is ση = 0.004 (Kichian 1999). Initial real interest rates, output, and inﬂation are given
by r0 = 0.03, y0 = 13.7, and π0 = 0.015 respectively.
It is assumed that the central bank believes the economy to be in excess supply
at time 0,8 with E0(y∗0) chosen consistent with the belief of the central bank being
incorrect (and the economy actually being in excess demand) 45, 15, and 1 percent of
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the time respectively. That is, E0(y∗0) = y0 +Z(
√
V0(y∗0)) where (for the former case) Z
corresponds to the score in the standard normal distribution associated with 45 percent of
the upper tail being greater than Z. The 45 percent case may be thought of as high initial
uncertainty as to the level of potential output, with the 1 percent case corresponding to
low initial uncertainty. The initial level of potential output, y∗0 , satisﬁes y
∗
0 = E0(y
∗
0)+y∗
where y∗ ∼ N(0, V0(y∗0)) and V0(y∗0) = (0.005)2. The impact of real interest rates on
output is γ = 1.0 (Duguay 1994).
At time zero, the central bank believes that the slope of the Phillips curve is E0(β) =
0.5, which is consistent with a sacriﬁce ratio of 2 when the central bank has no credibility.9
The value of α0 is chosen to be consistent with this: E0(α0) = E0(β)E0(y∗0). The true
value of β satisﬁes β = E0(β) + β , where β ∼ N(0, V0(β)), and V0(β) = (0.05)2. The
central bank’s initial estimates of V0(α0) and C0(α0, β) are chosen to be consistent with
V0(β) and V0(y∗0):
V0(α0) = (E0(β))2V0(y∗0) + (y
∗
0)
2V0(β) + V0(y∗0)V0(β),
C0(α0, β) =V0(β)y∗0 . (19)
The economy is simulated with varying degrees of central bank credibility (0 ≤ λ ≤ 1).
In every period, the central bank updates their estimates of αt, β, their variances and
covariance, and uses these new estimates in the selection of policy. Certainty equivalent
and conservative “passive learning” policies are constructed for all periods. A grid search
is then used to ﬁnd the ﬁrst period interest rate that minimizes the expected value of
the central bank’s losses over 10,000 artiﬁcial runs of the future, assuming a conservative
policy for all periods following the ﬁrst period. This will converge to the optimal active
learning policy as the sample size increases.10
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6. Results
The policy based on (14) is labeled the certainty equivalent policy, (16) the conser-
vative policy, and the simulated policy that incorporates an optimal amount of learning
the active learning policy.
First consider simulations 1 to 3, the results of which are given in Table 1 (2 and 10
periods) and Figure 1 (10 periods only). High initial uncertainty (simulation 1) refers to
an economy where the initial point estimates of the central bank indicate a state of excess
supply at time 0, but the initial variance estimates indicate a 45 percent probability of
being wrong. For moderate and low uncertainty (simulations 2 and 3), these percentages
are 15 and 1 respectively.
The certainty equivalent policy is slightly more aggressive than the conservative
policy, although as credibility increases, the extent to which they diﬀer diminishes. The
optimal policy with active learning is more aggressive than the alternative policies at low
levels of credibility, but becomes less aggressive as credibility rises. In the recent past,
monetary policy in Canada has generally adjusted in 25-basis-point increments. Except
at low levels of credibility, the eﬀect of active learning on policy is always much less
than one increment. Also, the impact of uncertainty (that is, the diﬀerence between the
certainty equivalent policy and the conservative policy) is not large. Even the diﬀerence
between an economy with a life of two periods and one with 10 periods is negligible,
except at very low levels of credibility.
The results of simulation 3 yield the greatest diﬀerence in policy caused by active
learning. This is the situation where the central bank has an extremely good initial
information set and is almost certain that the economy is in excess supply. Under these
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circumstances, a central bank with little credibility should run a more aggressive mone-
tary policy in order to learn optimally about the parameters of the economy.
Next, σ, ση,
√
V0(y∗0), and
√
V0(β) were increased by a factor of 5 in simulations 4
through 7 respectively to examine the robustness of this result to more extreme parameter
variability (see Figure 2 for the 10 period results).11
Increased inﬂation shock volatility (simulation 4) results in an optimal learning pol-
icy that is substantially more aggressive than alternative policies, although the extent
of this declines as credibility rises. At low levels of credibility, the optimal nominal in-
terest rate is equal to its lower bound, and even with moderate levels of credibility, the
diﬀerences are still signiﬁcantly greater than 25 basis points. Very similar results are
also obtained for increased potential output shock volatility (simulation 5). Increased
uncertainty about the initial level of potential output (simulation 6) produces qualita-
tively similar results, although the magnitude of the diﬀerence in policies is smaller. In
contrast, increased uncertainty as to the value of β (simulation 7) drives a wedge between
the certainty equivalent and conservative policies, with the optimal learning policy lying
between these.
These results indicate that probing may be beneﬁcial for a central bank with low
or moderate credibility if the economy is experiencing large inﬂation or potential output
shocks or if the central bank has very poor information about the level of potential
output. However, increased uncertainty about the slope of the Phillips curve does not
warrant much change in the optimal policy in order to learn.
Next, a two-period world in which both output and inﬂation are targeted was con-
sidered, with parameter values set equal to those considered in simulation 1 (see Figure
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3). The certainty equivalent policy for the ﬁrst period is obtained from (17), and for the
second period from (14). The conservative and active learning policies for the ﬁrst period
are both obtained using simulation methods. For the conservative policy, the policy that
minimizes ﬁrst period loss is appropriate, while for the active learning policy, the policy
that minimizes combined ﬁrst and second period losses is appropriate, where the interest
rate in the second period is set according to (16).
With a small weight on deviations of output from potential, there is little change
from the results already described. However, if deviations of output from potential are
weighted equally in percentage terms with deviations of inﬂation from target (ω = 1;
simulation 9), there is a divergence between the conservative policy and the certainty
equivalent policy, with the optimal learning policy almost indistinguishable from the lat-
ter. Once again, as credibility rises, this divergence diminishes. Finally, if the monetary
authority places very little weight on inﬂation deviations from the target (simulation 11),
credibility has little bearing on the optimal policy and all three policies are quantitatively
very similar.
Finally, diﬀerent levels of initial inﬂation are considered under low uncertainty (see
Figure 4). In simulation 12, initial inﬂation is equal to the target (π0 = 0.02), in sim-
ulation 13 π0 = 0.015, while in simulation 14, initial inﬂation is far from the target
(π0 = 0.00). First note that the active learning policy is more aggressive, relative to
the certainty equivalent policy, if initial inﬂation is closer to the inﬂation target. How-
ever, relative to the conservative policy, the degree of active learning is largely invariant
to the initial level of inﬂation. Once again, optimal probing is small relative to the
25-basis-point policy increments observed in practice.
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7. Conclusions
Simulations have been conducted here on an artiﬁcial economy calibrated to reﬂect
a simple model of the Canadian economy, where probing is interpreted as following a
more aggressive policy in order to learn about the parameters of the economy. The
optimal amount of probing for a central bank that seeks to target inﬂation has been
shown to be generally small, and to vary little with credibility. Only with low levels
of credibility or unrealistically large levels of uncertainty or volatility does the optimal
policy with probing diverge by more than one policy increment (25 basis points) from
a policy that ignores learning. Even then, for most forms of uncertainty, the optimal
amount of probing diminishes as credibility rises.
The results also suggest that the optimal amount of probing decreases with credi-
bility because of the positive impact increased credibility plays in reducing output and
inﬂation volatility in the economy. The central bank’s estimated equation (9) eﬀectively
equates the inﬂation gap (inﬂation less expectations) with the output gap. At higher lev-
els of credibility, these gaps are small on average and increasingly indistinguishable from
the shock terms. The information contained in a new observation is small under such cir-
cumstances, and the central bank’s estimates do not change very much over time whether
the central bank chooses to probe or not. In contrast, at lower levels of credibility, there
will generally be signiﬁcant inﬂation and output gaps, with larger improvements in the
precision of the central bank’s estimates from one period to the next. The informational
beneﬁts from probing are therefore greatest at low levels of credibility, resulting in a
negative relationship between the optimal amount of probing and the level of credibility
enjoyed by the central bank.
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There are several limitations to this analysis. First, credibility is assumed known by
the central bank and is independent of policy. In reality, a monetary authority cannot be
sure of the amount of credibility it enjoys, and the act of probing may result in reduced
credibility.
Second, the scope of uncertainty is this model is limited. The monetary authority is
uncertain only about the level of potential output and the slope of the Phillips curve. The
reality facing policy-makers is that uncertainty is considerably more pervasive. In this
setting, the beneﬁts to probing may be larger, although this remains to be established.
Third, the initial estimation errors the central bank makes in estimating β and y∗0
are independent of each other. In general, these estimates will be negatively correlated
so that an overestimate of the slope of the Phillips curve will imply an underestimate of
the output gap.
Fourth, inﬂation has no impact on output in this model, and so aside from entering
the loss function of the central bank, has no cost to the economy. Therefore, the level
of credibility does not inﬂuence the policy that is required to attain an output target,
although it has a substantial eﬀect on the policy that is required to attain an inﬂation
target.
Finally, these results may be sensitive to the interpretation of probing considered.
Isard and Laxton (1998) develop an alternative view of probing in which probing only
occurs when inﬂation is low, and credibility is endogenous.
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Footnotes
1 Alternatively, a systematically tight monetary policy may result from a linear Phillips
curve if policy-makers think credibility (that is, the degree with which inﬂation expec-
tations are anchored to the target) is diﬃcult to attain but easy to lose. This has the
eﬀect of increasing the potential costs of expanding the economy too quickly relative
to the costs of a recession, and so leads to a less expansionary policy than would be
optimal without uncertainty. See Laxton, Ricketts, and Rose (1994) for an example
of this.
2 This provides the simplest possible case in which shocks to potential output are perma-
nent. It would also be possible to consider alternative, more realistic characterizations
of the evolution of potential output.
3 It would be possible to include a demand shock term in (11), although in this model
it is exactly equivalent to a shock to potential output. The central bank is concerned
about the value of the output gap, and uncertainty as to either component of that
gap is identical from their standpoint. If demand shocks were not permanent (that is,
the coeﬃcient on lagged output in (11) did not equal 1), then the eﬀect of a demand
shock would diverge from a potential shock.
4 λ is assumed known by the central bank. Srour (1999) shows that uncertainty about the
propagation of inﬂation (in this framework, uncertainty about the level of credibility)
leads to a more aggressive policy response being optimal.
5 With λ = 0, the model is equivalent to Wieland (1998).
6 See Wieland (1998, 15-18) for a more complete discussion.
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7 For example, Wieland (1998) uses a dynamic programming algorithm that provides
numerical approximations to the solution for the special case when potential output
is constant.
8 This assumption does not limit the applicability of the results, since monetary policy
is symmetric in this model.
9 Recent estimates of the sacriﬁce ratio for Canada include 1.5 (Dupasquier and Girouard
1992), 1.7 (Duguay 1994), and 2.2 (Fillion and Leonard 1997).
10 By deﬁnition, the optimal policy in a one-period world (when there are no beneﬁts
to probing) is given by (16). 10,000 runs were suﬃcient to ensure that the simulated
optimal policy matches the theoretical optimal policy to six decimal places (1/100th
of a basis point).
11 To avoid the nominal interest bound (rt ≥ −πet ), simulation 6 was conducted assuming
an initial real interest rate of 10 percent.
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Notation.
πt inﬂation
πet inﬂation expectations
yt output
y∗t potential output
rt interest rate
t inﬂation shock
ηt potential shock
αt Phillips Curve intercept
β Phillips Curve slope
νt Phillips Curve error
π∗ inﬂation target
ω weight on output in loss function
ρ discount rate
λ credibility
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Table 1. Real Interest Rate.
Active Active
Certainty Learning Learning
λ Equivalent Conservative 10 period 2 period
Simulation 1
High Initial Uncertainty About Potential
0.0 0.01937 0.01947 0.01926 0.01911
0.2 0.02138 0.02145 0.02139 0.02131
0.4 0.02338 0.02343 0.02342 0.02336
0.6 0.02538 0.02541 0.02539 0.02534
0.8 0.02738 0.02739 0.02737 0.02731
1.0 0.02938 0.02938 0.02935 0.02929
Simulation 2
Moderate Initial Uncertainty About Potential
0.0 0.01482 0.01492 0.01416 0.01442
0.2 0.01682 0.01690 0.01670 0.01665
0.4 0.01882 0.01880 0.01891 0.01879
0.6 0.02082 0.02086 0.02083 0.02078
0.8 0.02282 0.02284 0.02281 0.02276
1.0 0.02482 0.02482 0.02472 0.02474
Simulation 3
Low Initial Uncertainty About Potential
0.0 0.00837 0.00846 0.00629 0.00740
0.2 0.01037 0.01044 0.00981 0.00995
0.4 0.01237 0.01242 0.01205 0.01231
0.6 0.01437 0.01440 0.01438 0.01432
0.8 0.01637 0.01638 0.01636 0.01630
1.0 0.01837 0.01837 0.01834 0.01828
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Simulation 1: High uncertainty
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Simulation 2: Moderate uncertainty
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Simulation 3: Low uncertainty
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Simulation 4: Large σ ε  
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Simulation 7: Large V 0(β )
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Simulation 8: ω =0.1
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Simulation 9: ω =1.0
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Simulation 10: ω =10
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Simulation 11: ω =100
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Simulation 4: Large σ ε   
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Simulation 12: π 0=2.0 
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Simulation 14: π 0=0.0 (detrended)
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Simulation 13: π 0=1.5 (detrended)
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